Cyberattackers tend to focus on end users to get into an environment, traversing the network and systems these attackers hunt for accounts with access to sensitive data -- their target. While the ultimate “keys to the kingdom” are administrative accounts such as Local Administrator and highly-privileged IT user accounts, non-user accounts such as those used by applications and services also need to be protected. If you’re only securing end user and privileged user accounts, your leaving half of the accounts in your environment -- application and service accounts -- at risk of being compromised.
Mandiant M-Trends 2015 Report indicated:
“Attackers target privileged accounts such as local administrator, domain administrator, and service accounts. Reduce the number of privileged accounts. Also, ensure that all local administrator accounts have unique passwords.”
There are a few current trends affecting a growing number of applications authenticating to other applications or services for successful completion of a task:
- Modern multi-tiered web applications. The web layer must authenticate to the computer layer, which authenticates to the database where data is stored.
- Clustered solutions such as Big Data environments. NoSQL and Hadoop require services running on nodes that must authenticate with other nodes in the Big Data cluster. This includes service accounts such as hdfs, hbase, hive, impala, mapred, yarn, zookeeper, etc.
Additionally, the configuration of a new server with all the requisite agents can be cumbersome and in many cases applications or agents will require a service account to be provisioned on each system. For example, you may require several accounts such as Splunk or ArcSight Logger and Nagios to exist so that you can monitor the system logs and performance, you may also need another account to enable a central management tool to login and perform management functions. Then there are applications such as Oracle database that require a local service account for the process to run.
The rights or privileges that these types of accounts require, whether access to remote systems (Hadoop service accounts and file transfer batch job scripts) or to control access to sensitive local data (Oracle or HDFS account), present as much if not more risk if a cyberattack were successful in taking over these accounts. Attackers know IT likes to automate the management of servers or file transfers, so they look for these accounts because typically they will allow the attacker to move laterally to other servers within the data center. Organizations need to make sure to enforce strong password management as well as access controls for these accounts to reduce their identity-related risk. Centrify has introduced several new features that integrates with existing capabilities to provide a complete solution for managing these non-human service accounts.
- Local Account Provisioning – Centralizes the management of local accounts and groups within Centrify Server Suite Zones.
- Shared Account Password Management – Provisioned local accounts are automatically added to Centrify Privilege Service for password management.
- Application to Application Password Management – Centrify provides a secure model for enabling scripts to checkout a password for a service account.
- Local Account Discovery – Centrify Deployment Manager discovers computers and their existing local accounts on Linux and UNIX systems.
Local Account ProvisioningCentrify Server Suite 2016 introduces new capability for Local Account Provisioning:
- local accounts can be created, updated, disabled, and removed from /etc/passwd
- local groups can be created, updated, removed and membership can be managed
Shared Account Password Management
Application to Application Password Management
PASSWORD=$(dzdo /usr/sbin/cgetaccount --silent "$REMOTE_CPS_RESOURCE_NAME/$CPS_USER" 2>> $LOG_FILE)
sshpass -d 300 scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no $SCP_USER@$SCP_HOST:"$SCP_FILE_SRC" "$SCP_FILE_DST" 300<<
<"$SCP_PASSWORD" >> $LOG_FILE 2>&1
Local Account Discovery
This is written by the individual author in his/her personal capacity, and the opinions, views and/or thoughts expressed herein are solely the author’s own. They are not intended to and may not necessarily reflect the official policy or position, or the opinions or views of ThycoticCentrify or its affiliates, employees, or any other group or individual.